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Employment Law: Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa:
Returning to Title VII's Core Principles by Eliminating the
Direct Evidence Requirement in Mixed-Motive Cases*
1. Introduction
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act)1 in response
to what it perceived to be the U.S. Supreme Court's curtailment of employee
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Among the decisions
that Congress determined were incorrectly decided was Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,3 a plurality decision. The Price Waterhouse decision not only
allowed employees to maintain a cause of action under a mixed-motive
theory,4 but it also allowed employers to escape liability under the same-action
defense.5 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that for
plaintiffs to be entitled to proceed to a jury on a mixed-motive theory, they
must prove by direct evidence the existence of discriminatory animus on the
part of their employer.6
The 1991 Act codified the Supreme Court's recognition of a mixed-motive
theory of discrimination. Under the 1991 Act, "[A]n unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."
7
* The author would like to dedicate this work to his wife, Amy, for her unwavering love
and support. In addition the author would like to thank the countless friends and family who
have contributed to his growth and success both personally and professionally.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). The portions of the 1991 Act that are relevant to this note
were subsequently incorporated into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
3. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
4. Under a mixed-motive theory, employees must prove that their employer considered
both legitimate (e.g., performance, tardiness) and illegitimate (i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin) factors in taking the adverse employment action against them. Id. at 241. The
mixed-motive theory ultimately allows employees to successfully litigate their claims without
the burden of proving the "precise causal role" that the illegitimate considerations played in the
adverse employment action. Id. Instead, employees must show that an illegitimate considera-
tion was merely a factor in the employer's decision. Id.
5. Id. at 242. Justice Brennan, writing for a four-justice plurality, concluded that "an
employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person." Id.
6. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[P]laintiff must show by direct evidence that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
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This new method of establishing that an employer violated Title VII departs
from the traditional method of proving unlawful discrimination in
employment, which required Title V11 plaintiffs to proceed under the
framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green.' In addition,
employers traditionally had a complete defense to complaints that they
violated Title VII if they "[could] demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that [they] would have taken the same action against the employee
even absent any discriminatory or retaliatory motive." 9  The 1991 Act
significantly limited the effect of this same-action defense by preventing
employers who successfully asserted the defense from completely escaping
liability under Title VII. " Moreover, the 1991 Act omitted any reference to
the direct evidence requirement imposed by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse." The principal case ultimately
arises from this omission.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa2 stands as a tribute to results-oriented
jurisprudence. In Costa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress overruled
the direct evidence requirement of Price Waterhouse. 3 In doing so, the Court
carelessly interchanged important terms that have distinct and specific
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see infra Part II.A.
9. Shea v. Tosco Corp., Nos. 98-35588, 98-35658, 98-36019, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
18610, at *5 (9th Cir. July 27, 2000).
10. Today, the same-action defense merely limits the remedies available to employees.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of
this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court- (i)
may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)),
and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the
pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Id.
11. For purposes of precedent, most lower courts consider Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion as the holding of Price Waterhouse. See generally Watson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
207 F.3d 207, 215 (3rd Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Nat'l Football Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997); Fuller v.
Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir.
1993); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); Ostrowski v.
At. Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2nd Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (1 th
Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990).
12. 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (Costa III).
13. Id. at 98.
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meanings, effectively creating confusion and ambiguity where the opportunity
to add clarity to the law plainly existed. In addition, the Court's analysis of
the 1991 Act's effect on Price Waterhouse's direct evidence requirement is
fundamentally flawed because it ignores (1) the essential holding and
precedential value of Price Waterhouse,4 (2) basic rules of statutory
interpretation,' 5 and (3) the opposite conclusion reached by a vast majority of
the circuit courts. 6 The more appropriate decision in Costa would have been
to uphold the direct evidence requirement of Price Waterhouse and seize the
opportunity to identify which definition of direct evidence employed by the
circuit courts was the correct definition. 17
Despite Costa's analytical shortcomings, its conclusion lends credence to
the idea that the Supreme Court has recommitted itself to the goals and
policies of Title VII. Accordingly, Costa may induce greater employer
compliance with Title VII because the lowered evidentiary burden may
increase the number of successful Title VII claims. In addition, conciliation
and settlements may also increase as employers become less eager to engage
in risky jury trials given employees' lessened evidentiary burdens. Moreover,
though the Court's opinion is poorly reasoned, Costa furthers the important
national goal of ending discrimination in the workplace, which justifies the
Supreme Court's holding.
Part II of this note discusses the law before Costa. This section emphasizes
the traditional pretext theory by which parties to Title VII litigation
proceeded, the addition of the mixed-motive theory following Price
Waterhouse, and the fundamental differences between the two theories. Part
HI also includes a short discussion of the 1991 Act, Congress's purpose in
passing the 1991 Act, and the Act's impact on Title VII litigation. Part mH
14. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part IV.B.2.
16. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
17. The different definitions of direct evidence developed by the lower courts can be
divided into three distinct groups: (1) the "classic position," which "require[s] mixed-motive
plaintiffs to present evidence that suffices to prove, without inference, presumption, or
consideration of other evidence, that a discriminatory animus motivated the defendant employer
in the challenged employment decision"; (2) the "animus plus position," which defines "direct
evidence [as including] statements or conduct by the employer that directly reflect the alleged
discriminatory animus, and that relate precisely to the employment decision at issue"; and (3)
the "animus position" which "requires only direct or circumstantial evidence that shows a
discriminatory animus." Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for
Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REv. 234, 239-40 (2001). The essential
difference in all three positions is the "[amount] of circumstantial evidence that the courts allow
to satisfy the direct evidence requirement." Id.
2004]
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describes the factual events giving rise to Costa and provides a brief
discussion of the litigation and the opinions of the lower courts. Further, Part
II discusses the issue that was presented to the Supreme Court, the holding
of the Court, and the basis of the Court's decision. The next section of this
note, Part IV, critiques the Court's opinion by focusing on the Court's misuse
of important and well-defined terms, as well as the incorrect interpretation of
the 1991 Act's effect on mixed-motive cases. In addition, Part IV
demonstrates that it is contrary to congressional intent to collapse mixed-
motive and pretext theories into one theory to prove discrimination under Title
VII. Despite the analytical shortcomings of the decision, Part IV argues that
Costa signals the Court's recommitment to the governing principles of the
federal civil rights legislation - a recommitment that is not surprising given
the Court's recent aggressive scrutiny in the constitutional context." This
note concludes with a discussion of Costa's impact on the burden employees
carry in Title VII litigation and on employers' compliance with Title VII's
mandates.
If. The Mixed-Motive Landscape Before Costa
A. The Creation of the Mixed-Motive Theory in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green9 established the pretext framework
under which Title VII 0 litigation traditionally proceeded until the addition of
the mixed-motive theory in Price Waterhouse.2' Under the pretext framework,
plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.22 To meet their burden, plaintiffs must prove:
18. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) (noting that race may
be accounted for in university admissions policies only if taken holistically with all other
relevant factors; holding that awarding "a point" to applicants solely on the basis of race
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515,524 (1996) (requiring an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for gender-based
classifications challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,226 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to even
benign discrimination based on race).
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
20. Title VII is the portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that forbids discrimination in
employment. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
21. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989).




(i) that [they belong] to a [protected class]; (ii) that [they] applied
and [were] qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite [their] qualifications, [they] were
rejected; and (iv) that, after [their] rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of [plaintiffs'] qualifications.23
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, employers have the burden
of "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection. 24 If they articulate such a reason, employees have the
ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proffered reason "[is] in fact pretext[ual]."25  The McDonnell-Douglas
framework has been effective in ridding the workplace of some employment
discrimination; however, it has not cured all discrimination because
employees' success under the traditional framework depends on their ability
to prove "but for" causation.26 For example, under McDonnell-Douglas,
employees who claim that their former employer has violated Title VII must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "but for" the employees being
members of a protected class, their employer would not have taken the adverse
employment action against them.27 In contrast, employees who proceed under
a mixed-motive theory of discrimination merely have to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that an impermissible consideration was a
motivating factor in an adverse employment action.2"
Price Waterhouse established an employee's right to maintain a cause of
action for discrimination under a mixed-motive theory.29 As Justice O'Connor
noted in her concurring opinion, the procedure for Title VII litigation needed
to change if the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace was to
become a reality.3° The Court announced the new mixed-motive theory in
Price Waterhouse, indicating that the Court realized that a significant amount
of discrimination that occurs in the workplace is often masked with legitimate
reasons for taking an adverse employment action.3' Although Price
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 804.
26. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-44 (2000).
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
29. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,241 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that "a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins
submitted by partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform to certain gender
2004]
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Waterhouse was a plurality opinion, a majority of the Court was able to agree
on at least two grounds: (1) employees should be able to proceed under a
mixed-motive theory, and (2) employers could still avoid liability under Title
VII by successfully asserting the same-action defense.32 As previously noted,
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion sought to require an employee
proceeding under a mixed-motive theory to prove discrimination by direct
evidence.33 By recognizing that Title VII plaintiffs could proceed under a
mixed-motive theory, the Court gave employees the tools necessary to attack
discrimination carried out under the auspices of legitimate considerations.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Congress passed the 1991 Act in response to a few significant U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, 4 including Price Waterhouse, that dealt with
employees' rights under the federal employment laws. The portion of the
1991 Act that addresses Price Waterhouse codified plaintiffs' ability to
proceed under a mixed-motive theory in Title VII litigation. However, rather
than accepting the same-action defense as articulated by the Court,35 Congress
approved a narrower version of the defense.36 Under the 1991 Act, the
stereotypes as a factor militating against her election to the partnership" and "these evaluations
were given 'great weight'...." Id. These evaluations were significant because they included
legitimate assessments of Hopkins's professional abilities in addition to the illegitimate
comments about her failure to conform to gender stereotypes. Id. at 233-35 (Brennan, J.,
plurality).
32. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
261-62 (White, J., concurring).
33. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
34. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,694-96.
Among the cases that the 1991 Act expressly dealt with were Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989),
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), Library of Congress v. Shaw,
478 U.S. 310 (1986), Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2,
(II) at 2-4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694-96.
35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
36. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000) provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of
this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court - (i)
may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)),
and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the
pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award




successful assertion of the defense only limits employees' available remedies,
rather than completely alleviating employers of Title VII liability.37 Notably,
Congress failed to address the effect of the 1991 Act on Price Waterhouse's
direct evidence requirement, which lower courts had nearly universally
applied.3 9 This shortcoming led to much disagreement among lower courts
concerning whether the direct evidence requirement still existed. The vast
majority of courts recognized that the requirement was retained but were
uncertain about the appropriate definition of direct evidence.' Thus, Costa
presented the U.S. Supreme Court with the opportunity to dispel this'
confusion.4"
III. Statement of the Case: Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
A. Facts Giving Rise to the Dispute
Catharina Costa was the sole female employee in a traditionally male
occupation.42 She worked in a warehouse for Desert Palace, operating
forklifts and other heavy machinery.43 Costa's supervisors generally gave her
favorable evaluations, and testimony at trial indicated that when Costa was
promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Id.
37. Id.
38. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[P]laintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor
in the decision.").
39. See generally Watson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3rd Cir. 2000);
Thomas v. Nat'l Football Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198,204 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Plair v. E.J. Brach
& Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir.
1995); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1993); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power
Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cit. 1993); Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 181
(2nd Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1991);
EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920,924 (11 th Ci. 1990); Jackson v. Harvard Univ.,
900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990).
40. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838,851-54 (9th Ci. 2002) (en banc) (Costa
If) (noting the three different definitions applied by the circuit courts, but declining to apply any
direct evidence requirement in light of the 1991 Act). See also supra note 17 for an explanation
of the different requirements of the three distinct direct evidence definitions.
41. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (Costa III). The issue presented
in Costa was "whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to
obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .... Id.
42. Costa II, 299 F.3d at 844.
43. Id.
2004]
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working, her employer "knew... the job would get done."'  Despite her
apparently adequate job performance, Costa felt that she was not treated
equally among her male counterparts.45
On many occasions, Costa was reprimanded for conduct that went
undisciplined when engaged in by male employees.46 Costa was repeatedly
written up, counseled, and eventually "stalked" at work by a supervisor.47
While Costa performed her job functions well, she did not exhibit the
interpersonal skills of a "model employee. '48 For example, she was involved
in numerous verbal disputes with co-workers and had a reputation for being
a "bitch. 49 Costa's troubles with her employer culminated when she was
involved in a physical altercation with a male employee after he confronted
her about rumors that she had reported him for taking extra long lunch
breaks.50 Although Desert Palace only suspended the male employee involved
in the fight, Desert Palace fired Costa.5 Subsequently, Costa filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada for employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.52
B. The District Court's Holding
At trial, Costa presented circumstantial evidence that her gender played a
role in Desert Palace's decision to terminate her.53 The district court provided
ajury instruction that reflected the rule of Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act
by requiring the jury to find in favor of Costa if they determined that her
44. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 845. Costa's trial testimony indicated that "when men came in late, they were
often given overtime to make up the lost time" while "she was issued a written reprimand" for
the same behavior; "when men missed work for medical reasons, they were given overtime to
make up the lost time" and when Costa missed work for the same reason she was "disciplined."
Id. Another witness's testimony confirmed that, in one instance, a number of employees were
"in the office eating soup on a cold day" when a supervisor "looked directly at Costa, and said,
'Don't you have work to do?' [but] did not reprimand any of [the male employees]." Id. Costa
further contended that "she received harsher discipline than the men," she was "treated
differently than her male colleagues in the assignment of overtime," and she "was penalized for
her failure to conform to sexual stereotypes." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 845-46.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 846.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 859-62 for the Ninth Circuit's summary of the evidence presented by Costa




gender played a motivating factor in Desert Palace's decision.54 Furthermore,
the jury instruction also required the jury to limit Desert Palace's liability if
they found the employer would have taken the same action despite Costa's
gender, thus accurately reflecting the 1991 Act's version of the same-action
defense.55 Desert Palace objected to the jury instruction on the grounds that
Costa had not presented direct evidence of discrimination, and therefore, she
was not entitled to a mixed-motive jury instruction.56 The trial court overruled
the objection and submitted the case to the jury, who later returned a
substantial verdict for Costa.57 The issue of the propriety of the jury
instruction was preserved for appeal and became the issue that was ultimately
argued to the U.S. Supreme Court.
C. The Opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court's decision on the grounds that the jury had been improperly
instructed.58 Relying on the holdings of the vast majority of other circuit
courts,59 the Ninth Circuit held that the direct evidence requirement of Price
Waterhouse was not abrogated by the 1991 Act, and thus, the plaintiff still had
to produce direct evidence of discrimination if she was to receive the benefit
of a mixed-motive instruction.' The Ninth Circuit denied Costa's petition for
54. Id. at 858.
55. Id. The trial court's mixed-motive jury instruction read:
You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was
motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that
the plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. However, if you find
that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and
lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The
plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the
plaintiffs gender had played no role in the employment decision.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 846. Costa was awarded $64,377.74 in back pay, $200,000 in compensatory
damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. Id.
58. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (Costa 1). The court
required "substantial evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly reflecting
discriminatory animus" for plaintiff to be deserving of a mixed-motive instruction. Id.
59. Id. at 886. All the other circuits have "reached the conclusion that evidence that merely
raises an inference... is not sufficient." Id.
60. The Ninth Circuit appeared to adopt the "animus position" definition of direct evidence
by only requiring evidence that "directly reflect[ed] discriminatory animus." See id. at 884;
2004]
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rehearing but unanimously agreed to withdraw the opinion of the three-judge
panel and hear the case en banc.61
D. The Opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals En Banc
A divided Ninth Circuit reversed the three-judge panel's prior decision and
held that the 1991 Act destroyed the direct evidence requirement for mixed-
motive cases, despite the opposite conclusion reached by its sister circuits.62
The majority noted Congress's direct assault on portions of the Price
Waterhouse decision63 and concluded that because Congress did not expressly
adopt the direct evidence requirement, the 1991 Act implicitly overruled such
requirement.6' The dissenting judges, however, found that because Congress
did not expressly overrule the direct evidence requirement, it should remain
in effect.65 Furthermore, the dissent noted that other courts overwhelmingly
agreed with their position.66 Desert Palace appealed this decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which subsequently granted certiorari.67
E. The Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court
The issue presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was "whether a plaintiff
must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-
motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.,,68 In a unanimous decision authored by
Justice Thomas, the Court held that the 1991 Act did not require a "heightened
[evidentiary] showing. ' 69 Thus, the previous requirement imposed by Price
Waterhouse was no longer good law.7" Justice O'Connor wrote a separate
Mizer, supra note 17, at 239-40.
61. Costa 1, 268 F.3d at 884, reh'g en banc granted, 274 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 2002). The
panel unanimously decided to withdraw its opinion, which is reported at 238 F.3d 1056 (9th
Cir. 2000), and denied the petition for rehearing. The Ninth Circuit subsequently agreed to
rehear the case en banc. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (2002) (en banc).
62. Costa I, 299 F.3d at 854.
63. Id. at 850.
64. Id. at 850-51. The premise for the direct evidence requirement was abrogated by the
limitations placed on the same-action defense in the 1991 Act. Id. The Ninth Circuit made this
conclusion though neither the text nor the legislative history of the 1991 Act refers to the direct
evidence requirement. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
65. Costa II, 299 F.3d at 866 (Gould, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
68. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (Costa III).





concurring opinion noting that Congress's codification of "a new evidentiary
rule" abrogated the previous requirement of direct evidence. 7,
After rehashing the decisions of the lower courts and the history of the
direct evidence requirement,72 the Court focused on three different
justifications for its conclusion. First, the Court analyzed the text of the 1991
Act.73 In its analysis, the Court correctly noted that the statute fails to mention
the direct evidence requirement.74 The Court concluded that the only burden
textually required of employees proceeding under a mixed-motive theory is
that they "demonstrate that an employer used a forbidden consideration with
respect to any employment practice. '75 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the
only evidentiary burdens Congress placed on plaintiffs were the traditional
"burdens ofproduction and persuasion." 76 In the Court's view, had Congress
intended to impose a "heightened showing,"77 Congress would have expressly
done so as it had done in the past.78
The second justification the Court found for abrogating the direct evidence
requirement was somewhat of a corollary to the previously noted justification.
Specifically, the Court determined that because Congress was silent about the
type of evidence required under a mixed-motive theory, the traditional rule in
civil cases - that the burden of proof can be met by either circumstantial or
direct evidence - was implied. 79 After noting that circumstantial evidence
is not only an adequate means of proving a plaintiff's case, but is often more
71. See id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote separately to explain
that the previous direct evidence requirement "triggered the deterrent purpose of [Title Va],"
but Congress's codification of a "new evidentiary rule" abrogated such requirement. Id.
72. See generally id. at 93-98.
73. Id. at 98-99.
74. Id. at 99-100.
75. Id. at91.
76. Id. at 99 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)).
77. This note points out in Part IV, infra, that the Court's habitual use of direct evidence
as synonymous with increased evidentiary burdens is unfounded and is one of the shortcomings
of this opinion.
78. Costa 11i, 539 U.S. at 99.
79. Id. It should be noted that the Court included in its definition of the "conventional rule"
a statement that the "plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of evidence." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Fundamental to this note is the idea that merely requiring plaintiffs to meet
their burden of proof by a specific type or quality of evidence does not change the quantitative
amount of proof required of plaintiffs. The Court's statement about the burden of proof in civil
cases and the types of evidence that can be used in such cases unreasonably blurs the line
between these two distinct concepts.
4132004]
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persuasive than direct evidence,'0 the Court proceeded to the third and final
justification for its decision.
The third part of the Court's analysis focused on the use of the term
"demonstrates" in both 1991 amendments to Title VIL8" Essentially, the Court
concluded that because the same-action defense allows employers to satisfy
their burden of persuasion in asserting the defense by circumstantial and direct
evidence, the use of the same term in adopting the mixed-motive theory
implicitly allows employees to prove their cases in the same manner absent
any congressional intent to the contrary.
82
On first impression the Court's analysis in Costa seems persuasive. The
discussion that follows, however, contends that the Court created ambiguity
in the law where it should have refrained from interchanging distinctly defined
terms. The court also incorrectly interpreted the impact of the 1991 Act on the
direct evidence requirement by ignoring the precedential value of Price
Waterhouse, thus failing to properly use important rules of statutory
interpretation and ultimately acting contrary to congressional intent. Despite
the analytical shortcomings of the opinion, this note concludes that Costa
demonstrates the Court's recommitment to the core principles of Title VII.
IV. Analysis
A. Misuse of Direct Evidence Creates Ambiguity in the Law
In reaching its conclusion, the Court treated the requirement of direct
evidence as synonymous with a heightened burden of proof.83 Direct evidence
is concerned with the type of evidence that must be produced for a party to
satisfy the burden of proof." In contrast, the burden of proof implicates the
80. Id. at 100. "Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more
certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957)).
81. Id. at 100-01; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
82. Costa Il, 539 U.S. at 101; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
83. Costa II, 539 U.S. at 99. Congress's failure to include language imposing a direct
evidence requirement on plaintiffs proceeding under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination
"is significant, for Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof
requirements in other circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, this indicates the Court's
view that requiring direct evidence is equivalent, or at least analogous, to increasing the burden
of proof.
84. Black's Law Dictionary defines direct evidence as "[e]vidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999). After Price Waterhouse, each of the lower
courts adopted one of the three definitions of direct evidence (classic, animus plus, and animus),




quantum of evidence that a party must present to continue with its case. 5 By
speaking of these two distinct concepts as if they were interchangeable terms
with the same meaning and significance, the Court risked creating uncertainty
in the law where none was necessary. 6 The Court's misuse of direct evidence
as a substitute for a heightened burden of proof not only creates difficulties for
future courts and attorneys in distinguishing the important differences between
these concepts, but also illustrates why the Court's concern with placing an
"increased evidentiary burden" on plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases is ill-
founded.87 Specifically, the Court incorrectly held that requiring employees
to present direct evidence of discrimination8 8 to receive a mixed-motive
instruction is the equivalent of raising the plaintiff s burden of proof without
congressional authorization. 9
The direct evidence requirement in Price Waterhouse did not have this
effect. Rather, the direct evidence requirement merely specified the type of
evidence required to prove discrimination. Thus, the burden of proof
remained the traditional preponderance of the evidence, which is the same
852-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Costa I1) (discussing the three definitions of direct evidence
adopted by the lower courts).
85. The burden of proof "includes both the burden of persuasion and the burden of
production." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted). The burden
of persuasion requires a party in a civil case to "convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a
way that favors that party . 'by a preponderance of the evidence"'; while the burden of
production is the party's "duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue
decided by the fact-finder." Id.
86. There has long been a judicial preference for clarity in the law where it is attainable.
See Home v. Coughlin, 178 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1999); John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F.
Supp. 1514, 1526 (D. Minn. 1985).
87. Costa II1, 539 U.S. at 99.
88. EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1990), provides an
example of direct evidence. In that case, an employee who was responsible for making
decisions regarding the hiring and promotion of employees stated that "if it was his company,
he wouldn't hire any black people." Id. Because the statement was made by a decisionmaker
and directly reflected discriminatory animus in a specific employment activity, the court held
it to be direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive instruction. Id.
In contrast, the court in Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1996), held that
evidence that a decisionmaker had "hired black and female applicants to avoid claims of race
and sex discrimination, [referred to an employee] as 'the black guy,' [told] racial jokes...
[used] the 'N' word and would not shake (the black employee's hand] when he was being
evaluated for [a different position]" was not direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 1542.
"[D]irect evidence of discrimination is rare." Id. "Stray remarks . . . statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself"
are not direct evidence. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989).
89. Costa 111, 539 U.S. at 99-100.
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burden that must be met in other civil cases. Moreover, direct evidence in
mixed-motive cases does not require more evidence, as the Court implies, but
rather, better evidence of discrimination.' Justice O'Connor recognized the
need for better evidence in mixed-motive cases because when employees
prove that a prohibited factor was taken into account, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer.9' According to Justice O'Connor, employees should
present sufficiently powerful evidence to justify a shift in the traditional
paradigm of proof in civil cases.
9 2
Costa gave the Court a chance to acknowledge the confusion among the
lower courts and to recognize, in a bright-line manner, the important
distinction between type of evidence and burden of proof. If the Court had
distinguished between the type of evidence required and the burden of proof
placed on Costa, only the most important question would remain - which of
the lower courts' definitions of direct evidence should be adopted.93 By
failing to initially make the important bright-line distinction and subsequently
failing to adopt a uniform standard for direct evidence, the Court failed to
create clarity in the law. Instead, the Court chose to eliminate the direct
evidence requirement altogether and in the process risked creating ambiguity
in the law by using distinct legal terms interchangeably.
B. The Court's Rationale for Destroying the Direct Evidence Requirement
is Flawed
1. The Court Ignored Justice O'Connor's Precedent From Price
Waterhouse
Given that Price Waterhouse was a plurality opinion, the limited
precedential value of Price Waterhouse allowed the Court to easily overrule
the direct evidence requirement in Costa. Plurality decisions are troublesome
because, rather than having a clear rationale to follow, they present lower
courts and attorneys with at least two differing rationales.94 The lower courts
have the burden of determining which rationale should be followed for
purposes of precedent.95 In Marks v. United States,96 the Supreme Court
provided some guidance for determining which rationale of a plurality opinion
90. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 17.
94. Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DuKE L.J. 419, 426 (1992).
95. Id.




courts should follow as precedent. 7 For purposes of precedent, the holding in
plurality opinions is found by determining the narrowest possible grounds of
the opinion.98 Given the rule in Marks, it appears that lower courts must
follow as precedent the rationale that has the least potential for making
sweeping changes to the law.
Clearly, the narrowest holding of Price Waterhouse was Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion because none of the other Justices would have
required direct evidence to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. 9 Justice
O'Connor's opinion not only recognized that employees could claim relief
under Title VII by pursuing a mixed-motive theory, but also required
employees .to prove their employer's animus toward them by direct
evidence."o Significantly, nearly all of the circuit courts have recognized
some form of direct evidence requirement, even after the enactment of the
1991 Act.'0 ' In fact, the Ninth Circuit was the only appellate court to hold that
the direct evidence requirement was eliminated by the new legislation. 02
Given that all of the circuit courts except the Ninth Circuit held that the
direct evidence requirement survived the 1991 Act, and the apparent
precedential value of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse, the decision of the Supreme Court to eliminate the direct
evidence requirement seems peculiar at best. Rather than eliminating the
direct evidence requirement entirely, the Court in Costa should have
recognized the precedential value of Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse
concurrence and adopted one of the three definitions of direct evidence
developed by the circuit courts. 03 If the Court had seized this opportunity, it
could have weighed the interests of employees, employers, and the goals and
policies of Title VII in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the Court chose to
97. See id. at 193-94.
98. Id. at 193 ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds."')
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.)).
99. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 258-61 (1989).
100. See id. at 275-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. See Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., 282 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2002);
Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920,925 (8th Cir. 2001); Shorter v. ICG Holdings,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999); Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125
F.3d 1390, 1394 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1997); Ostrowski v. At. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d
Cir. 1992).
102. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Costa
II).
103. See supra note 17.
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sidestep the issue and take the less prudent path of eliminating direct evidence
in mixed-motive cases.
2. The Court Ignored Important Rules of Statutory Interpretation
The Court's errors in deciding Costa are not limited to the Court's failure
to afford Price Waterhouse proper precedential weight. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court made inappropriate and ill-founded conclusions
regarding both the implications of the express statutory language of the 1991
Act and the congressional intent behind the statute. Central to the Court's
holding was the idea that because the text of the statute did not impose a direct
evidence requirement on mixed-motive plaintiffs, the Court had no power to
require one. °4 The Court correctly observed that the relevant provisions of
the 1991 Act say nothing about the direct evidence requirement.'05 However,
the Court's ability to find, implicit in the statute's silence, congressional intent
to abrogate an established evidentiary requirement is puzzling. When a statute
is silent, courts should not infer the intent of the legislature.0 6 Thus, because
no portion of the 1991 Act addresses the direct evidence requirement, 0 7 the
judicially created rule requiring such evidence in mixed-motive cases should
remain in effect.'0 8 In light of this fundamental principle, the Court clearly
erred in interpreting Congress's silence as an intent to destroy the evidentiary
requirement imposed by Price Waterhouse. 9
104. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003) (Costa III) (noting that
Congress's failure to make its intent clear is significant).
105. Id.
106. CHW West Bay v. Thompson, 246 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is incorrect to
make assumptions on congressional intent from Congress's silence .... Congress' failure to
distinguish.., does not constitute the kind of 'direct speech' indicative of clear congressional
intent.... .") (emphasis omitted).
107. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
108. See Palmore v. Sup. Ct. of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that
"repeals by implication.., are disfavored."). While Palmore was concerned with the repeal of
the district court's power to hear habeas corpus petitions, the same principal seems to be logical
when dealing with law created by legislatures, as in Palmore, and in dealing with law created
by the judiciary, as in Costa.
109. For other cases holding that courts should not infer an intent to overrule existing law
from congressional silence, see CHW West Bay, 246 F.3d at 1224, United States v. Rivera, 153
F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1998) ("An inference drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot
be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional
intent.") (internal citations and quotations omitted), In re Providence Television Ltd.
Partnership, 75 B.R. 139, 140 (N.D. I1. 1987) ("Where Congress knows how to say something





"[S]tatutory construction is, at best, an imperfect science, ' "'0 and mistakes
should be expected when the Court delves into such a practice. As the Court
correctly noted in Costa, the first step in statutory interpretation is an analysis
of the statutory text.111 After such analysis, no further interpretation is required
if the meaning of the statute is clear.1 12 Because the text of the relevant statute
in Costa was void of any language expressly addressing the direct evidence
requirement, the Court incorrectly concluded that no purview into the
legislative history of the 1991 Act was necessary.' Given the unhelpful
nature of the 1991 Act's text, the Court should have explored the legislative
history of the statute to determine congressional intent relating to the direct
evidence requirement." 4
Exploring the legislative history of the 1991 Act reveals that Congress was
primarily concerned with decisions such as Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio"5 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'16 rather than Price Waterhouse. 1
7
In fact, the provisions of the 1991 Act that dealt specifically with Price
Waterhouse were only concerned with providing statutory recognition for the
mixed-motive theory and restricting the scope of the same-action defense.'
18
110. Palmore, 515 F.2d at 1299 (quoting Schiaffo v. Heltoski, 492 F.2d 413, 428 (3d Cir.
1974)).
111. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003) (Costa 111).
112. Id. at 93-94.
113. Id.
114. Palmore, 515 F.2d at 1299 ("Where doubts exist and construction is permissible,
reports of the committees of Congress and statements by those in charge of the measure and
other like extraneous matter may be taken into consideration to aid in the ascertainment of the
true legislative intent.").
115. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
117. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
694-96. The opinions that Congress was concerned with were Independent Federation of Flight
Attendantsv. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989),
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), Library of Congress v. Shaw,
478 U.S. 310 (1986), Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II,
at 2-4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694-96.
118. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 65-66, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 751-52. The
portion of the 1991 Act that dealt directly with the Price Waterhouse opinion merely sought to
"reaffirm[ ] that any reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal." H.R. REP.
No. 102-40, pt. II, at 2, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695. The statute also set out the
appropriate relief for such discrimination by preventing the courts from ordering "the hiring,
retention or promoting of a person not qualified for the position." H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II,
at 3, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695.
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Even more revealing about Congress's intent regarding the direct evidence
requirement is the statement in the report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor that "[s]ection 5 overturns one aspect of ... [Price
Waterhouse] by adding a new subsection ... to Title VII."" 9 The "one
aspect" that the House Committee addressed was the scope of the same-action
defense.'20 This is evident from the statement in the Education and Labor
Committee's report that Price Waterhouse "undercut [Title VH's] prohibition
[by] threatening to undermine Title VH's twin objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered
by victims of discrimination."'' Clearly, Congress believed that a same-
action defense that alleviated employers of all liability significantly undercut
the deterrent value of Title VU.
Contrary to the Court's holding in Costa, Congress may have intended to
retain the direct evidence requirement. Not only did Congress fail to mention
the direct evidence requirement in the statute, but relevant portions of the
1991 Act's legislative history also indicate Congress's intent to retain the
direct evidence requirement.'22 The House Education and Labor Committee's
reports reveal that Congress intended the 1991 Act to establish "the rule
applied by the majority of the circuits,"' which, as previously noted, required
some form of direct evidence. Furthermore, if the Court had taken the
additional step of reviewing the relevant legislative history, it may have
avoided trying to decide which of the three direct evidence definitions to
adopt in Costa. Congress indicated which definition of direct evidence it
intended to adopt by stating:
Conduct or statements are relevant under this test only if the
plaintiff shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the
employment decision at issue. For example, isolated or stray
remarks not shown, under the standards generally applied for
119. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 16, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 709 (emphasis
added).
120. See id.
121. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 11, at 17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 710 ("[In]
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made clear that it intended to prohibit all
invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in employment
decisions.").
122. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 11, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711; H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586.




weighing the sufficiency of evidence, to have contributed to the
employment decision at issue are not alone sufficient.
24
Thus, it appears that Congress not only intended to maintain the majority view
that direct evidence was required in mixed-motive cases, but also determined
that the "animus plus' ' 125 definition was appropriate.
The justification for maintaining the direct evidence requirement after the
passage of the 1991 Act is two-fold. First, because Congress failed to address
the direct evidence requirement either by express or implicit action, the rule
of Price Waterhouse, that direct evidence is required to justify a mixed-motive
instruction, should have remained in effect. This is because "[a]n inference
drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is
contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional
intent." 12' As previously noted, the legislative history that is available
regarding the relevant portions of the 1991 Act indicates that the inference
drawn by the Court in Costa clearly weighs against the textual and contextual
evidence of the statute. 27 Second, the legislative history of the 1991 Act
indicates, implicitly if not expressly, that Price Waterhouse imposed a direct
evidence requirement in mixed-motive cases. 128 Furthermore, it appears that
Congress sought to maintain such an evidentiary requirement to justify the
burden shifting in mixed-motive cases. Notably, requiring a specific type or
quality of evidence has no effect on the quantity of evidence an employee
must produce. Therefore, compelling mixed-motive plaintiffs to prove their
cases by direct evidence does not make employees' cases more difficult to
prove by requiring a higher amount of evidence. Rather, it attempts to justify
the burden of proof shift to the employers and breaks with the standard burden
in civil suits by requiring employees to present better quality evidence. 
29
124. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586
("Conduct or statements are relevant under this test only if the plaintiff shows a nexus between
the conduct or statements and the employment decision at issue, under the standards generally
applied for weighing the sufficiency of evidence.").
125. The "animus plus" view of direct evidence has been described as "includ[ing]
statements or conduct by the employer that directly reflect the alleged discriminatory animus,
and that relate precisely to the employment decision at issue." Mizer, supra note 17, at 240.
126. United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809,812 (1998) (quoting Burns v. United States, 501
U.S. 129, 136 (1991)).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711; H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586.
128. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711; H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586.
129. A helpful illustration of this important distinction can be found in the culinary world.
Assuming a recipe calls for two cups of wine, the "burden" can be satisfied by using any wine
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3. A Merger of Pretext and Mixed-Motive Theories is Contrary to
Legislative Intent
At least one commentator has noted that the abandonment of the direct
evidence requirement essentially merges mixed-motive and pretext theories
into one theory of discrimination 30 because, without the direct evidence
requirement, "there seems to be little practical difference between pretext and
mixed-motive cases."'' Before Costa, two essential differences existed
between the theories: (1) the number of motivations involved in making the
employment decision,'32 and (2) the requirement that mixed-motive plaintiffs
present direct evidence of discriminatory animus. 133 By eliminating the direct
evidence requirement, the distinction between the theories becomes factual
rather than legal.'34 Thus, post-Costa, the argument for collapsing mixed-
motive and pretext cases into one theory under Title VII is premised on the
assumption that the two theories are not "fundamentally different causes of
action.""'b However, the previous discussion regarding the legislative history
of the 1991 Act and the structural makeup of Title VII indicates that Costa's
collapse of the two theories into one is in itself contrary to congressional
intent."'
As previously noted, the 1991 Act's legislative history indicates Congress's
intent to retain the direct evidence requirement.'37 However, support for the
argument that Costa inappropriately collapsed the two theories of
discrimination in Title VII litigation into one theory is not limited to the
legislative history. The structure of Title VII also provides evidence of
congressional intent to maintain the direct evidence requirement, thus keeping
the two theories necessarily distinct. The fact that the pretext theory'38 and
or any combination of wines, so long as the amount is correct. However, if the chef really wants
the dish to taste its best, he will want to use the highest quality wine. Thus, the recipe is not any
more difficult or burdensome to make with the highest quality wine, but the dish may certainly
taste better when the chef uses "the good stuff."
130. Kelly Pierce, A Fire Without Smoke: The Elimination of the Direct Evidence
Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc., 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2205-07 (2003).
131. Id. at 2205.
132. Id. at 2206.
133. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Pierce, supra note 130, at 2205.
135. Id. at 2207.
136. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 122-24.




mixed-motive theory139 are found in separate sections of Title VII is
significant.
Congress's intent to formulate two separate standards for Title VII
plaintiffs, to seek relief is evidenced by the enactment of an entirely
independent section of the 1991 Act that codifies the mixed-motive theory."4
If the Costa decision is an accurate portrayal of congressional intent, as the
Court claimed, 4' Congress would have merely amended the existing section
to provide for a mixed-motive theory, rather than create an entirely new
section within an already complex statute. By creating an entirely different
section within Title VII,' 42 Congress indicated that the theories embodied in
these sections are fundamentally different. The abolition of the direct
evidence requirement essentially merges these two theories into one and
defeats the reason for enacting these theories in separate sections of Title VII.
Thus, it is logical to conclude that the direct evidence requirement is indeed
a significant reason, if not the only reason, for having two separate theories for
discrimination actions under Title VII.
C. Costa Signals a Recommitment to the Principles of Title VII
While "the purpose of Title VII is not punitive but corrective,"' 43
Congress's ultimate goal in enacting the historic legislation was "to eradicate
unlawful discrimination."'" By allowing employees to use a mixed-motive
theory under Title VII and prove discrimination by either circumstantial or
direct evidence, the Court has taken an important step toward the realization
of this goal. Although the Court incorrectly equated the direct evidence
requirement with an increased burden of proof, allowing employees to prove
discrimination under a mixed-motive theory by circumstantial or direct
evidence increases employees' chances of obtaining relief under Title VII.
Employees are more likely to be victorious after Costa because circumstantial
evidence is typically more common than direct evidence of discrimination."'
By making it easier for employees to successfully litigate their claims under
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
140. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(m).
141. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (Costa II1). The Court
specifically noted that, "where, as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the 'judicial
inquiry is complete."' Id. at 98 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992)).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
143. Pearson v. W. Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976).
144. Adams v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
145. See Costa 111, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500,508
(1957)).
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Title VII, the Court has indicated its continued resolve to end discrimination
in the workplace.
1. Costa Mirrors the Court's Recent Pattern of Taking a More
Aggressive StandAgainst Discrimination on Constitutional Grounds
Considering the Supreme Court's recent constitutional case law, it is not
surprising that the Court also seeks to renew its commitment to ending private
sector discrimination. 46 While merely changing the type of evidence allowed
to carry a party's burden of proof seems insubstantial compared with decisions
regarding discrimination on constitutional grounds, the converse may be more
accurate. In fact, discrimination frequently occurs in the private sector
between private actors, such as discrimination by employers against
employees of protected classes. 4" Congress recognized the need to address
discrimination in the workplace, which resulted in the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
The slight alteration in Costa of the requirements for employees proceeding
under a mixed-motive theory allows for the principles of Title VII to be more
readily enforced. As a result of the increased enforcement, there is a greater
chance of achieving the goals of the statute. i4 In enacting Title VII,' 49
Congress clearly understood that ending private sector discrimination ensures
that all American citizens receive the benefits promised by this country's
founding principles.' In Costa, the Court may also have realized that if the
146. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
147. See S. REP. No. 88-872, at 2356 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356.
The fundamental purpose for passing Title VII was to "guarantee all persons freedom from
refusal by an included establishment or organization to deal with them on account of race, [sex],
color, religion, or national origin." Id.; see Adams, 932 F. Supp. at 664 ("Title VII was
designed to eradicate unlawful discrimination, and the private right of action against an
employer was intended to provide a remedy [against such employer].").
148. See Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1073 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("By
enacting Title VII.... Congress attempted to pass a law that would prevent the perpetuation of
pernicious stereotypes, eliminate the degradation of persons who share certain protected
characteristics, and thus open up employment opportunities to those persons."). The
"prevention of pernicious stereotypes" by opening up the employment arena is best served by
allowing those plaintiffs who have been discriminated against to enforce their rights under the
statute. This is the reason Congress provided a private cause of action under Title VII. See id.
The "underlying purpose of Title VII is to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers
to employment when those barriers operate to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or other
protected characteristics." Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).




fundamental notions of this country are to become a reality, victims of
discrimination should not be limited only to discrimination that they can prove
by direct evidence. To eradicate discrimination, the law must allow
employees to challenge and defeat discrimination, regardless of whether the
allegations are supported by direct evidence. By allowing employees to prove
their mixed-motive theories of discrimination with circumstantial or direct
evidence, Costa signifies a minor change in the law that constitutes one large
stride toward ending workplace discrimination. Indeed, Costa expands the
scope of Title VII to encompass those forms of discrimination that may not
have been easily proven under the Price Waterhouse direct evidence
requirement:
2. Response to Congress's Criticism Regarding the Rash of Cases
Favoring Employers
Another signal of the Court's recommitment to Title Vii's core principles
of "'mak[ing] whole' victims of unlawful employment discrimination,"''
eradicating unlawful discrimination,'52 and achieving "voluntary compliance
with the nondiscrimination prohibitions,"' 53 is that the Court recognizes and
accepts Congress's motive in enacting the 1991 amendments to Title VII).'
Specifically, the Court held that the purpose of the 1991 Act was not only to
reverse certain decisions with which Congress disagreed, but also to
strengthen the rights of employees.'55 An examination of the analysis in Costa
indicates that the Court agreed with the mission of Congress in enacting the
1991 legislation.
As previously noted, the statute in question fails to speak, either by
implication or expression, to the direct evidence requirement of Price
that ending private sector discrimination "make[s] good at long last the guarantees of our
Constitution.").
151. Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653, 655 (11 th Cir. 1984).
152. Adams, 932 F. Supp. at 664.
153. S. REp. No. 88-872, at 2378, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2378.
154. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 694.
The 1991 Act had two primary purposes: (1) "to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions;" and (2)
"to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to
provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination."
Id.
155. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-95 (2003) (Costa II1). "Congress
passed the 1991 Act 'in large part as a response to a series of decisions of this Court interpreting
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964."' Id. at 94 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 250 (1994)) (internal alterations omitted).
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Waterhouse.'56 Despite the analytical shortcomings of Costa, the elimination
of the direct evidence requirement indicates the Court's willingness to pursue
the goals announced by Congress in passing the 1991 Act. Though
elimination of the direct evidence requirement was not warranted by the text
or history of the 1991 Act, the justification for the repeal of the direct
evidence requirement was plainly implicated by the 1991 Act's social
policy.' 7 By eliminating the direct evidence requirement, the Court served
the goal of strengthening employee rights by providing them with a method
of meeting their burden of proof that previously did not exist.'58 This change
was made even though the vast majority of the circuits reached the opposite
conclusion, and despite Congress's silence regarding the direct evidence
requirement. 5 9 More importantly, the Court's willingness to strengthen
employees' rights under Title VII, despite the precedent of Price Waterhouse,
indicates a renewed commitment by the Court to the core principles of Title
VII.160
D. Effect of Costa's Recommitment
1. Employees' Cases Are Easier to Prove
Practically speaking, the most important aspect of the Costa decision is its
impact on Title VII litigation. By allowing employees to receive a mixed-
motive jury instruction when they have met their burden of proof by either
circumstantial or direct evidence, it is likely that courts will find more
employers liable for violating Title VII. This is because circumstantial
evidence is generally more readily available than direct evidence, regardless
of which definition of direct evidence one uses. 16 ' Because there is a
prospectively greater amount of satisfactory evidence in mixed-motive cases
after Costa, there is a greater potential for successful Title VII claims.
Congress's restriction of the effective scope of the same-action defense, as
opposed to the abolition of the direct evidence requirement, will most likely
be the cause of any "flood of litigation" that may result from the Costa
decision.
156. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
157. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 556; H.R. REP.
No. 102-40, pt. II, at 2, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) (providing Title VII plaintiffs with a mixed-motive
theory).
159. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991).
160. See Pearson v. W. Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976).




The same-action defense under the 1991 Act'62 merely limits the remedies
available to plaintiffs if the defendant is able to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action
even if the forbidden characteristic was not considered.'63 In contrast, the
same-action defense, as promulgated in Price Waterhouse, would have
allowed the defendant to completely escape liability."6 Once this important
distinction is noted, it becomes apparent that, although Costa may make it
easier for employees to present enough evidence to defeat an employer's
summary judgment motion, any increase in litigation because of encouraged
employees is probably a result of the new scope of the same-action defense,
as defined by Congress. The lack of a complete same-action defense, coupled
with a more liberal evidentiary scheme as a result of Costa, may lead to a
greater number of Title VII claims, and logically, more employees' verdicts.
In addition to increasing the likelihood of liability in Title VII actions,
Costa brings the requirements of proof under mixed-motive theories in line
with the evidentiary requirements of other civil suits. 165 Thus, Costa appears
to further support the idea that the Court has recommitted itself to the
principles of Title VII. Alternatively, to require direct evidence in mixed-
motive cases is not only atypical of civil actions, but also may indicate a
judicial prejudice against civil rights litigation. 166 Ultimately, the Court made
the correct decision by holding that mixed-motive Title VII cases require the
same evidence as other civil suits.
2. Greater Compliance Because of a Threat of Litigation and a Potential
for More Settlements
Because of the increase in the likelihood of success for those employees
pursuing Title VII claims under a mixed-motive theory, it is logical to
conclude that the potential for employees to be more inspired to pursue
litigation also increases. With this likelihood noted, it becomes increasingly
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
163. Id.
164. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
165. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 551 F. Supp. 1239, 1242
(D.C. Pa. 1982) ("In a civil case... the burden of [proof] ... [is] a preponderance of the
evidence.").
166. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1328 (E.D. Mich.
1988) ("Among the factors to be considered in allocating the burden of proof is an estimate of
the probabilities, fairness, and special policy considerations."). If the Court had continued to
apply an increased evidentiary burden to mixed-motive plaintiffs, the balance of these factors
would cause plaintiffs to bear an increased risk of unsuccessful litigation. This would seem at
odds with the Court's and Congress's intention to end workplace discrimination.
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
important for employers to be proactive in eliminating even inconsequential
considerations of forbidden characteristics, so as to minimize the potential for
litigation. Interestingly, by increasing the chances for employees to be
successful through an adversarial process, the Court has given employers
further incentive to comply with the mandates of Title VII before becoming
involved in expensive litigation. The increased incentive corresponds nicely
with Title VII's goal of "voluntary compliance with the nondiscrimination
prohibitions."' 67 Should employers fail to comply with Title VIl's commands,
the increased potential of liability for unlawful discrimination may result in
an increased number of settlements to avoid costly litigation. Although
perhaps unintentional, one of the potential results of Costa is to further the
policy of conciliation and compensation, which was within the original
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68
V. Conclusion
Despite the analytical shortcomings of Costa, the decision was the correct
conclusion in light of the important policies served by eliminating the direct
evidence requirement in mixed-motive Title VII litigation. In eliminating the
direct evidence requirement, the Court ignored important rules of statutory
interpretation, its own precedent, and express congressional intent regarding
the evidentiary requirements in mixed-motive cases. However, "[iun a nation
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal ... discrimination
has no place."' 169 Costa indicates that the Court is aware of its opinion's
implications on the continued viability of discrimination in the workplace. In
the end, Costa serves as a reassurance that the Court is "pledge[d] . . .
unreservedly to [the] eradication" of discrimination. 
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167. S. REP. No. 88-872, at 2378 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2378.
168. Pearson v. W. Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976).
169. S. REP. No. 88-872, at 2362, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2362.
170. Id.
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